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Consistency is one of the touchstones used to evaluate not only arguments but also the people that put forward the arguments. In assessing the person advocating an argument, it is natural to look for coherence over time in their arguments and, secondly, whether the person offers a convincing explanation for a change of view. We apply this framework to evaluate some of Paul Krugman's macroeconomic analysis.
Froth and Bubble in 2002
In the New York Times in August 2002, Paul Krugman writes: 'To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback; it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble' (Krugman 2002) .
In blog and newspaper pieces around that time Krugman is encouraging the Federal Reserve to achieve such stimulus through looser monetary policy. For example, he argues: 'It's still not clear that Mr. Greenspan has caught up with the curve -let's have at least one more rate cut, please.' (Krugman 2001 ). Yet half a decade later he argues: 'If there are two guys that I blame for this crisis it would be, in order, Alan Greenspan and Phil Gramm.' (Krugman 2008a) It is reasonable enough to change one's mind. But to change one's mind without explanation, and to compound the aggravation by damning those who implemented the very policy that one favoured at the time, is extraordinary. There are many more things that one might want to take into account but even so it is hard to find evidence of sufficient importance to justify Krugman's extremely pessimistic assessment of the situation in mid-2002.
Moreover, there are well-respected alternative views of policy in that recession. For example, according to Taylor's (2007) estimates, the traditional Taylor rule (that had described the Federal Reserve's behaviour quite well up until that time) prescribed increases of the Fed Funds rate to start already at the end-2001, and to continue at a steady pace to reach 4 per cent at the end of 2003 (as opposed to the rate of 1 per cent observed at the time).
Deficit Trouble in 2003
By 2003 That may sound alarmist: right now the deficit, while huge in absolute terms, is only 2 -make that 3, O.K., maybe 4 -per cent of GDP. But that misses the point.
Think of the federal government as a gigantic insurance company (with a sideline business in national defense and homeland security), which does its accounting on a cash basis, only counting premiums and payouts as they go in and out the door. An insurance company with cash accounting…is an accident waiting to happen.
So says the Treasury under-secretary Peter Fisher; his point is that because of the future liabilities of Social Security and Medicare, the true budget picture is much worse than the conventional deficit numbers suggest.
Of course, Mr. Fisher isn't allowed to draw the obvious implication: that his boss's push for big permanent tax cuts is completely crazy. But the conclusion is inescapable. Without the Bush tax cuts, it would have been difficult to cope with the fiscal implications of an ageing population. With those tax cuts, the task is simply impossible. The accident -the fiscal train wreck -is already under way. (Krugman 2003) This is pretty much a mainstream view that many economists would understand. It's a point of view that John Maynard Keynes, who unlike many of his followers was not a proponent of over-reliance on deficit spending or tax cuts, would agree with. 4 But the issue again is the consistency of Krugman's arguments. As Lee (2009) 
observes:
The problem is that everything Mr. Krugman now writes entirely contradicts his 2003 article, despite the fact that every fundamental problem the economy faced six years ago is now much worse. Mr. Krugman has no issues with Barack Obama and Ben Bernanke committing the same atrocities the previous administration committed. President Obama has ramped up every budget, including the military budget, while Bernanke runs the presses faster than Greenspan ever did. Mr. Krugman has consistently stated throughout 2009/2010 that there is no danger of interest rates rising in the future and that the budget deficit is not disastrous by comparison to 1940s United States and 1990s Japan.
The Twist and Turns of Economic History
Nobody can be like Keynes and no book can be like the General Theory. It was a book that solved the problem that nearly brought down Western civilization.' (Krugman 2008b) There is no doubt that Keynes was one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century, but the claim that he 'solved the problem that nearly brought down Western civilization' is not supported by the evidence.
The Means to Prosperity, published in 1933, recommended increased public spending, though not necessarily deficits, as a means to reduce unemployment. 5 But there is little evidence that it had a direct effect on macroeconomic policy during the Great Depression. Skidelsky (2003) , Keynes' biographer, reports that Keynes' policy suggestions only began to influence US economic policy after 1939, by which time the depression had ended.
It is true that the Swedes did employ some Keynesian ideas in the Great Depression (Skidelsky 2003) . It is also true that German public spending in the Depression had some of the positive economic effects foreseen by Keynes. But, Keynes never claimed either of these examples as support for his ideas. Sweden was too small and the other German policies too abhorrent.
Truth and Beauty
So what are the lessons that Paul Krugman has learnt from the global financial crisis of 2007-09? Among others, in his highly publicised article (Krugman 2009b) he expressed the view that the state of macro 'is not good'. His argument is that the profession has mistaken 'beauty for truth' in terms of hi-tech models that do not reflect the economic reality.
Many others have dissected his arguments on this (see, for example, Cochrane 2009 or Kocherlakota 2009 ). We have documented the changing state and consistency of Paul Krugman's macroeconomic policy analysis. 6 The contrast between his assessment of 2002/2003 and 2008/2009 is so large and the justification for the changed view so ephemeral that we feel his policy recommendations no longer have the required consistency and coherency. Rather than being the substance that nourishes public debate they seem to conceal the substance.
